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PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL IN GEORGIA
The classic doctrine of consideration is that " . . . the
promise and the consideration must purport to be the motive
each for the other in whole or at least in part. It is not
enough that the promise induces the detriment or that detriment induces the promise if the other half is wanting."'
From this established concept of consideration, the doctrine
of promissory estoppel is a departure.
Perhaps the best definition of the doctrine, academically,
is to be found in Section 9o of the Restatement of Contracts,
which states:
"A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to
induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial charac.
ter on the part of the promisee and which does induce such action
or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by en-

forcement of the promise."'

The doctrine is not a new one, although the name "Promisory Estoppel" is new.' The English courts have long recognized the injustice of not binding one to his promise, after
the promisee has on faith of the promise been induced to
incur expense or rely on it to his detriment. Moses v. Macferlan4 scratched the surface to lay the doctrine, and Pillans
v. Fan Mierop5 flatly held that in commercial cases among
merchants, the want of consideration was not an objection.

The doctrine of promissory estoppel was firmly established in the Van Mierop case, though the Court did not

so call it. The origin of the doctrine may be found in Roman
Law. Vinnius, in his Commentaries on the Law of Justinian,
said that there was no radical defect in a contract for want
of consideration, but it was made requisite, in order to put
people upon attention and reflection, and to prevent obscur1. Wisconsin & Michigan R. Co. v. Powers, 191 U.S. 379, 24 S. Ct.
107, 48 L. Ed. 229 (1903).
2. New Eureka Amusement Co. v. Rosinsky, 126 Pa. 444, 191 Ati.
412 (1937); Langer v. Superior Steel Co., 105 Pa. Super. 579,
161 Atl. 571 (1932) (reversed on other grounds).
3. See 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 139 (Rev. Ed. 1936).
4. 2 Burr. 1005, 97 Eng. Rep. 676 (1760).
5. 3 Burr. 1664, 97 Eng. Rep. 1035 (1765).
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ity and uncertainty.' Both Grotius and Puffendorf argued
that if an undertaking was entered into upon deliberation
and reflection, it had activity and such promises were binding,7 and the first common law lawyer to put such binding
promises in the realm of contracts was Bracton.8 The Van
Aicrop case also said that a naked promsie was enforceable
if in writing or at least there were no prior cases holding a
midum paclum evidenced by writing to be bad.
niglish courts very early recognized the distinction between a nudumn paclum and a promise that had induced the
promisee to his detriment. For example, if a man promises
to buy a house for another and proceeds to pay part of the
purchase price, he may decline to finish buying the property
and deny the other the benefits of the promise; however, if
the other had moved onto the property and on faith of the
promise made expenditures, the promise would be enforced.9

The present day English law on the subject is stated by
Chitty:
" ...a distinction is to be made between the case of a mere
gratulitous promise and that of a promise on the faith of which
one party is induced to do some act which, but for such promise,
he would not have done."'"

The English courts have been eager to apply the doctrine
to commercial cases, as would behoove a great trading nation; but paradoxically, they have constantly refused to apply the doctrine to subscription promises to charitable institutions."
Conversely, American courts have developed the doctrine
mainly by applying it to subscription cases, where a person
pledges money to a charitable institution. If the institution
6.
7.
8.
9.

10.

Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Crosbie v. M'Doual, 13 Ves. 149, 33 Eng. Rep. 251 (1806). Skidmore v. Bradford, L.R. 8 Eq. 134 (1869) ; Boston v. Boston, 1 K.B.
124 (1904). Cf. Coverdale v. Eastwood, L.R. 15 Eq. 121 (1871).
CHITTY, CONTRACTS

43 (20th Ed. 1947) (citing Skidmore v. Brad-

ford, supra note 9, in support).
i1. i re Hudson, 54 L.J. Ch. 811, 33 W.R. 819, 1 T.L.R. 447 (1885).
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acts to its detriment on the faith of the pledge, the courts

will enforce the pledge."
Although the subscription cases almost universally reach
the result of enforcing the pledge, or promise, there are
three distinct theories upon which enforcement by American
courts is predicated. Most courts follow the theory that if
the promisee does work, or incurs expense, or acts to his
detriment on the faith and in reliance upon a subscription, a
consideration is thus furnished to support the promise. 3 A
lesser number of courts allowing recovery upon subscription
promises proceed in whole or in part upon the theory that
the consideration for a subscriber's promise is to be found

in the promises of the other subscribers." In Martin .v.
Meles," though recognizing that cases allowing recovery of

subscriptions upon the ground of expenditure made, or work
done, in reliance upon the subscription usually state the
reason in terms of consideration, Holmes, C. J., said,
"In the later Massachusetts cases more weight has been laid
on the incurring of other liabilities and making expenditures on
the faith of the promise of the defendant than on the counterpromise of the plaintiff."
12. Simpson v. Tuttle, 71 Iowa 596, 33 N.W. 74 (1887).
13. Strong v. Eldridge, 8 Wash. 595, 36 Pac. 696 (1894) ; School
District of Kansas City v. Stocking, 138 Mo. 672, 40 S.W. 656, 37
L.R.A. 406 (1897); Brooks v. Owen, 112 Mo. 251, 19 S.W. 723,
rehearing,20 S.W. 492 (1892) ; Koch v. Lay, 38 Mo. 147 (1866) ;
Steele v. Steele, 75 Md. 477, 23 Atl. 959 (1892) ; Univ. of Des
Moines v. Livingston, 57 Iowa 307, 10 N.W. 738, 42 Am. Rep. 42
(1881) ; Methodist Episcopal Church v. Garvey, 53 Ill. 401, 5 Am.
Rep. 51 (1870); Amherst Academy v. Cowls, 6 Pick. 427, 17 Am.
Dec. 387 (Mass. 1828) ; Pitt v. Gentle, 49 Mo. 74 (1871) ; Richelieu
Hotel Co. v. International Military Encampment Co., 140 Ill. 248,
29 N.E. 1044, 33 Am. St. Rep. 234 (1892).
14. Owenby v. Georgia Baptist Assembly, 137 Ga. 698, 74 S.E. 56,
Anti. Cas. 1913B 238 (1912)
Bryan v. Watson, 127 Ind. 42, 26
N.E. 666, 11 L.R.A. 63 (1891) ; Allen v. Dufflie, 43 Mich. 1, 4 N.W.
427, 38 Am. Rep. 159 (1880); George v. Harris, 6 N.H. 533, 17
Am. Dec. 446 (1829); Irwin v. Lombard University, 56 Ohio St.
9, 46 N.E. 63, 36 L.R.A. 329, 60 Am. St. Rep. 727 (1897); Furman
Univ. v. Waller, 124 S.C. 68, 117 S.E. 356, 33 A.L.R. 615 (1923).
15. 179 Mass. 114, 60 N.E. 397 (1901) ; Sherwin v. Fletcher, 168 Mass.
413, 47 N.E. 197 (1897) ; Cottage St. M.E. Church v. Kendall,
121 Mass. 528, 23 Am. Rep. 286 (1877).
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The Court in Gans v. Reimnensnyder'6 said,
a contract of the kind here involved is enforcible rather
by way of estoppel than on the ground of consideration

. . .

But

a subscription to a charity embodies in it no previous consideration; hence . . . it can be operative only by way of estoppel and
unless others have been thereby induced to subscribe, or some
undertaking has been commenced, or continued on the faith of
it, it cannot be regarded as a binding contract."

Using the subscription cases as an example, the lines of
theory regarding the doctrine of promissory estoppel were
thus drawn during the latter part of the 19 th Century and
the early part of the 2oth. After the use of the term "promissory estoppel" was advocated by Williston" and after the
publication of the Restatement of Contracts in 1932, American courts became less niggardly in applying the doctrine to
commercial cases; and lately it is noted that acceptance of
the doctrine is growing, the courts being very careful not
to apply it unless no other remedy is available." In Robert
Gordon, Inc. v. Ingersoll-Rand Co.'9 it was said,
"Generally the doctrine of promissory estoppel has been applied in subscription cases and in cases where the promise enforced has been non-commercial in character. Courts have not
been as generous in applying the doctrine to commercial transactions. .

.

. In the Baird case2" the court refused to apply prom-

issory estoppel to enforce a promise in a commercial transaction . . . However, we choose not to follow the Baird case.
The mere fact that the transaction is commercial in character
should not preclude the use of promissory estoppel."
16. 110 Pa. 17, 2 Atl. 425 (1885); Beatty v. Toledo Western College, 177 Ill. 280, 52 N.E. 432, 69 Am. St. Rep. 242, 42 L.R.A. 797
(1898) ; Landwerlen v. Wheeler, 106 Ind. 523, 5 N.E. 888 (1886) ;
Wesleyan Seminary v. Fisher, 4 Mich. 515 (1857) ; Doane v.
Treasurer of Pickaway & Circleville, Wright 752 (Ohio 1834).
17. 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 139.
18. Stelnack v. Glen Alden Coal Co., 339 Pa. 410, 14 A.2d 127 (1940)
Thom v. Thorn, 208 Minn. 461, 294 N.W. 461 (1940); Lacy v.
Wozencraft, 188 Okla. 19, 105 P.2d 781 (1940).
19. 117 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1941).
20. James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros., 64 F.2d 344 (2nd Cir. 1933).
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And other courts have agreed.2
The doctrine today is applied mainly to subscription contracts, but it is also generally applied to four other classes of
promises:
(i) A gratuitous promise to. convey land is binding when the

promisee has entered and improved the land.'
A promise not to foreclose a mortgage is binding after the
promisee has made investments in reliance thereon.2"
(3) A license is irrevocable after the licensee has changed his
position because of the license.'
(4) A gratuitous undertaking of a bailee is enforceable if it has
(2)

been relied upon.25

Georgia has followed the doctrine of promissory estoppel
in fact, but not in theory. Georgia's Courts do not recognize
the term "promissory estoppel," but spell consideration out
of the fact that one has relied on a promise to his detriment,
such consideration springing up when the detriment occurs
to the promisee. This has been the law in Georgia since
Austell v. Rice.2"
Georgia has applied its brand of the doctrine in license
cases in that after a person has made improvements or invested capital which must have necessarily preceded the
enjoyment of the license promised to him, it becomes an
agreement for a valuable consideration and the licensee a
21. Accord: Planter's Lumber Co. v. Trinity Universal Ins. Co., 191
Miss. 875, 4 So.2d 300 (1941); Volkwein v. Volkwein, 146 Pa.
Super. 265, 22 A.2d 81 (1941) ; Berry v. Maguire, 162 Pa. Super.
67, 56 A.2d 282 (1948) ; Klein v. Farmer, 85 Cal. App.2d 545, 194
P.2d 106 (1948) ; In re Jamison's Estate, 202 S.W.2d 879 (Mo.
1947); Hunter v. Sparling, 87 Cal. App.2d 711, 197 P.2d 807
(1949).
22. See Dozier v. Watson, 94 Mo. 328, 7 S.W. 268, 4 Am. St. Rep. 388

(1888).
23.
24.
25.
26.

See Faxton v. Faxton, 28 Mich. 158 (1873).
See Sheffield v. Collier, 3 Ga. 82 (1847).
Siegel v. Spear & Co., 234 N.Y. 479, 138 N.E. 414 (1923).
5 Ga. 472 (1848) ; Morrow v. Southern Exp. Co., 101 Ga. 810, 28
S.E. 988 (1897); Brown v. Bowman, 119 Ga. 153, 46 S.E. 410
(1903); Strachan v. Buford, 173 Ga. 821, 162 S.E. 120 (1931);
Purcell v. Armour Packing Co., 4 Ga. App. 253, 61 S.E. 138
(1908); Peoples v. Citizen's National Life Ins. Co., 11 Ga. App.
177,74 S.E. 1034 (1912).
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purchaser for value. 7 This doctrine has also been applied to
a gratuitous promise to convey land, where the promisee has
entered upon the land and made improvements.28
The case of McCowen v. McCord29 cites the Restatement
of Contracts § 9o, in support of its decision, but perverts the doctrine by holding that a consideration arose with
the detriment to the promisee.
However, in the subscription cases Georgia follows the
minority opinion of mutual promises supplying consideration each for the other states, Georgia Code § 20-304 states,
"A promise of another is good consideration for a promise.
In mutual subscription for a common object, the promise of
others is a good consideration for the promise of each."

That section states the rule which was laid down by case
law in Wilson v. First Presbyterian Church of Savannah."
In appraising the theory followed by most courts, that
detriment supplies consideration, the question arises: Did
the parties intend that the detriment to the promisee should
be a consideration? If they did not, the detriment cannot be
a consideration, because a much older and much more firmly established doctrine is that nothing is consideration for a
contract which the parties do not regard as such at the time
of entering into the contract." It seems rather incongruous
to say that it was the intent of the parties for a consideration
to spring up with a detriment to the promisee, and such was
the intent when the promise was made. The same doctrine
27.

Sheffield v. Collier, 3 Ga. 82 (1847) ; Mayor of the City of Macon
v. Franklin, 12 Ga. 239 (1852); Hiers v. Mill Haven Co., 113 Ga.
1002, 39 S.E. 444 (1901). Accord: Rawson v. Bell, 46 Ga. 19
(1872); City Council of Augusta v. Burum, 93 Ga. 68, 19 S.E.
820 (1893) ; Johnson v. Longley, 142 Ga. 814, 83 S.E. 952 (1914).
28. Beall v. Clark, 71 Ga. 818 (1883) ; Morris v. Orient Ins. Co.,
106 Ga. 472, 33 S.E. 430 (1898).
29. 49 Ga. App. 358, 175 S.E. 593 (1934).
30. 56 Ga. 554 (1876).
31. First Nat. Bank v. Shaw, 260 S.W. 309 (Tex. 1924) ; Beck v.
Sheldon, 259 N.Y. 208, 181 N.E. 360 (1932); Edrington-Minot
Corp. v. Murray W. Garsson, Inc., 219 App. Div. 65, 219 N.Y.
Supp. 155 (1st Dept. 1926) ; Comfort v. McCorkle, 149 Misc. 826,
268 N.Y. Supp. 192 (Sup. Ct. 1933) ; In re Brunswick's Estate,
143 Misc. 573, 256 N.Y. Supp. 879 (Surr. Ct. 1932); Philpot v.
Gruninger, 14 Wall. 577, 20 L. Ed. 743 (U.S. 1871).
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of intent of the parties 2 also applies to the mutual promise
theory. Is it the intent of each subscriber that such should
be the consideration ? If this question can be answered in the
affirmative, then, what of the promise of the first subscriber?
Those promises that produce injury should not be enforced
on the basis of an estoppel in pais, for a future promise is
not a misrepresentation of a fact and usually is not given
with intent to defraud." Such promises are future promises,
and if they are "binding at all they must be binding as contracts.""4
It seems that the pure doctrine of promissory estoppel
would solve and reconcile the conflicting theories. Courts
should firmly set these promises that induce detriment in the
field of contracts and flatly state that here is an exception
to the rule that future promises unsupported by consideration will not be enforced.
BURT DERIEUx

32.
33.

See note 31 supra.
See: Lacy v. Wozencraft, 188 Okla. 19, 105 P.2d 781 (1940)
In re Jamison's Estate, 202 S.W.2d 879 (Mo. 1947); Panso v.
Russo, 82 Cal. App.2d 408, 186 P.2d 452 (1947).
34. In re Watson's Estate, 177 Misc. 308, 30 N.Y.S.2d 577 (Surr. Ct.
1941); Fields v. Continental Ins. Co., 170 Ga. 28, 152 S.E. 60
(1930); Union Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Mowry, 96 U.S. 544,24 L.Ed.
674 (1877); See: Britain v. Bowden, 188 Ga. 806, 821, 5 S.E.2d

47, 57 (1939).

